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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT OASES
the defendant, and second, whether the defendant has a defense.
It is plain that the first question must be answered in the af-
firmative. McClary v. Knight, 73 W. Va. 385, 80 S. E. 866. The
statute imposed a duty upon the defendant to guard the saw, he
violated this duty and as a result the plaintiff was injured. Sec-
ond, the question whether contributory negligence is a defense.
The defendant is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
BARNEs' CODE, Chapter 15P, section 15; and has failed to comply
therewith. The Act, -CODE, supra, chapter 15P, section 26, pro-
vides, in effect, that as to any employer subject to the Act who
fails to comply therewith, such employer cannot set up contribu-
tory negligence as a defense. Therefore the statute bars this de-
fense, and the decision of the court is clearly justifiable. The
court in referring to the Compensation Act, said: "As the de-
fendant was not a subscriber to the workmen's compensation fund,
it cannot avail itself of the plaintiff's contributory negligence."
-ROSCOE H. PENDLETON.
EviDCE - HOMICIDE - SELF-DEFENSE-VIOLENT AcTs or DE-
CEASED.-In an indictment for murder the accused relied on self-
defense, and was permitted to testify that deceased was a danger-
ous man, and had on one occasion shot at an officer who was at-
tempting to arrest him. It was not shown that the accused saw
this occurrence. The officer was not permitted to testify as to
the incident. Held, that there was no error prejudicial to the
accused. State v. Peoples, 145 S. E. 389 (W. Va. 1928).
In general, proof of the character or reputation of the de-
ceased is inadmissible in homicide cases. Evers v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. 318, 20 S. W. 744; State v. Madison, 49 W. Va. 96, 38 S.
E. 492.
On the issue of self-defense, however, communicated reputation
for violence is admissible to show that the accused had reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Tircinski, 189
Mass. 257, 75 N. E. 261. There is some conflict as to uncom-
municated reputation of this character, but the better and ma-
jority rule is that such evidence is admissible to show the proba-
bility that the deceased did an act of aggression. State v. Mc-
Olausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938; Pamore v. State, 29 Ark.
248; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 224; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (2nd
ed.) §63.
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More complex problems arise as to the manner of proving
habits or character. The courts commonly confine such proof to
the general reputation of the deceased for violence, and exclude
all testimony of specific acts of violence, not closely connected in
time with the fatal recontre. Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642';
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1; People v. Henderson, 28
'Cal. 468; State v. Beird, 118 Ia. 474, 92 N. W. 694; Muscoe v.
Commonwealth, 87 Va. 460, 12 S. E. 790. The rule is apparently
based on two reasons: (1) Specific acts are not thought to sup-
port an inference as to character, on the theory that a person fre-
quently does acts, either good or bad, which are utterly at variance
-with his real character. Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 383,
140 S. E. 133; (2) the probative value of such evidence is out-
weighed by the fact that, if proof of such acts were admitted, so
also would repelling evidence have to be admitted, and the side
issues thus raised would be as numerous as the offenses. State v.
Walker, 92 W. Va. 499, 115 S. E. 443; People v. Farrell, 137
Mich. 127, 100 N. W. 264; State v. Roderick, 77 Oh. St. 301, 82
N. E. 1082.
Such a rule has no application to the case where the accused
had personal knowledge of the acts; for then the issue is not one
of character, but whether the accused was reasonably apprehen-
sive of danger to life or in fear of bodily harm. People v. Harris,
95 Mich. 87, 54 N. W. 648; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So.
8-35; State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 30, 92 S. W. 663; State v. Burton,
63 Kans. 602, 66 Pac. 633. The effect on the accused's mind
would be substantially the same whether he gained his informa-
tion of the dangerous character of the accused from his general
reputation in the community or from specific acts.
The application of reason to new cases seems to be hopefully in-
creasing in the use of the rules of evidence. Just as uncommuni-
cated general character and uncommunicated threats, according to
the better view, are admissible on the issue of whether the de-
ceased was the aggressor, so it would seem that uncommunicated
specific acts should be admissible, provided it can be said that
such prior specific acts of violence tend to show that the deceased
probably committed an act of aggression. It would seem, ac-
cording to the behaviorists at least, that such acts would increase
the probabilities. WATSoN, PsYcHorOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF A BEHAVIORIST (2nd ed. 1924) 320-321. Courts in the future
may be influenced by the prestige of behaviorism, for which ex-
travagant claims have been made.
As to the objection that the probative value of such evidence
is outweighed by the fact that it would unduly complicate the
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number of side issues, it would seem that a great deal should be
left to the discretion of the trial court. "When the turbulent
character of the deceased in a prosecution for homicide is rele-
vant, there is no substantial reason against evidencing the char-
acter by particular instances of violent or quarrelsome conduct.
Such instances may be very significant; their number can be con-
trolled by the trial court's discretion; and the prohibitory con-
siderations applicable to an accused's character, have here little
or no force." 1 WIGMRE, EVIDENCE, (2nd ed. 1924) §198.
Upon the facts, the holding of the court in the principal case
would seem correct. The accused had been allowed to testify as
to the specific act of violence. The fact that the officer was not
allowed to testify as to the same specific fact should not be held
reversible error.
-ByoN- B. RANDOLPH.
BuLK SALES ACT -FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-A sold his
stock of merchandise to defendant in violation of the Bulk Sales
Act. Defendant paid $3,417.90 of the entire purchase price of
$3,420.18 to certain creditors of A, and the remainder of $2.28
to A. The merchandise has been disposed of. At the time of the
sale A owed plaintiff $369.18 which is still unpaid. Plaintiff re-
covered judgment against A, had an execution issued thereon,
and garnished the defendant by suggestion under CODE, chapter
141, section 10. The lower court found for the defendant-
suggestee, and the supreme court reversed the decision. Emmons-
Hawkins Company v. Sizemore, 145 S. E. 438 (W. Va. 1929).
Our statute, chapter 141, section 10, provides: "On a sugges-
tion by the judgment creditor, that by reason of the lien of his
writ of fieri facias, there is a liability on any person other than
the judgment debtor"; that that person can be reached only
when he owes a debt to or has in his hands personal estate of
the judgment debtor, for which debt or personal estate an action
at law would lie. Swann v. Summers, et al, 19 W. Va. 115. Our
Bulk Sales Act, chapter 74, section 32, provides that the sale in
bulk, of any part, or the 'whole, of a stock of goods, wares, mer-
chandise and fixtures, pertaining to the conducting of said busi-
ness, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the
regular prosecution of the business of the seller, shall be fraudu-
lent and void as against the creditors of the seller, unless the
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